The International Mobility of Technical Talent: Trends and Development Implications by D'Costa, Anthony P.
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2006 
* Professor, Comparative International Development, University of Washington, Tacoma, WA 98402, 
USA; e-mail: dcosta@u.washington.edu 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on the International Mobility of Talent. 
UNU-WIDER especially thanks ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile) for its vital cooperation on the coordination of the project. 
UNU-WIDER also acknowledges with thanks the financial contributions to its research programme by 
the governments of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 
Norway (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611  ISBN 92-9190-927-0  ISBN-13 978-92-9190-927-8 
Research Paper No. 2006/143 
 
The International Mobility 
of Technical Talent 
 
Trends and Development Implications 
 





This paper charts the complex dynamics of the movement of technical talent in the 
world economy and assesses broadly the impact of such mobility on both sending and 
receiving countries. Based on secondary data and primary information from the Indian 
and Japanese IT industry, the study presents a global view of the movement of talent 
and its development and policy implications. By synthesizing disparate data and the 
multifaceted processes and outcomes of international mobility, the paper examines 
some of the distributional issues of gains and losses in both sending and receiving 
countries. 
Keywords: international migration, education, government policy, human capital, skills, 
information services, computer software 
JEL classification: F22, I28, J24, L86  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Adam Swallow at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks to Andrés Solimano and Tony Addison for their invitation to this project and to 
Joao Carlos Ferraz and project participants at the Santiago meeting for their feedback. 
Independently, research funded by the Abe Fellowship Program generated Japan-related 
information. Janette Rawlings provided research support and offered substantive and 
editorial comments. All errors and omissions are mine. 
 
The Tables appear at the end of the paper. 
 
   1
1 Introduction 
The emergence of the new economy, in which services and information and 
communications technologies (ICT) play a significant role, has created new 
opportunities for developing countries endowed with skilled workers. Competition 
among firms has intensified due to rapid innovations, shorter product cycles, and quick 
delivery (to market) time. It is also driven by the global availability of skilled workers 
(Florida 2005; Desai et al. 2002). While labour markets for skilled workers are not as 
globalized as capital markets (Brown 2001: 26-9), growing evidence of the international 
mobility of technical talent (Docquier and Rapoport 2004) has raised numerous 
questions on the causes and consequences of such movement for both sending and 
receiving countries. The liberalization of cross-border movements of people, even 
temporarily, arguably yields far more benefits to developing countries than economic 
integration based on the flows of goods and capital (Rodrik 2005). Consequently, 
questions about supply and demand of skilled workers, citizenship, and related 
immigration policies have drawn considerable attention (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004). In 
tandem, the demand by developing countries for the temporary movement of skilled 
workers to OECD markets under the General Agreement in Trade in Services (GATS) 
Mode 4 has brought the subject of international mobility of technical talent under 
greater scrutiny (Mattoo and Carzaniga 2003). It is widely recognized that that 
mismatch in the supply and demand of technical skills is driven by recruitment of talent 
by multinationals, increasing global trade and investment, demographic shifts, and 
increasing information technology (IT) business opportunities in emerging economies. 
The objective of this paper is to chart the complex dynamics of the movement of 
technical talent in the world economy and assess broadly the impact of such mobility on 
both sending and receiving countries. As more people move across borders, both 
temporarily and permanently, the economic and social fortunes of both poor and rich 
countries are bound in inextricable ways. Thus, from a developmental point of view, the 
distributional question of who gains from the mobility of talent and how best to capture 
the benefits of mobility for national development become salient. Based on secondary 
data, the study presents a global view of the movement of talent and its development 
and policy implications. It also relies on primary data from the Indian and Japanese IT 
industry to highlight international mobility issues. Admittedly, the data across countries 
are scattered and neither strictly comparable nor always reliable. A modest attempt has 
been made to synthesize the disparate data and multifaceted processes and outcomes of 
international mobility to highlight the trends and implications for development. The 
next section of the essay provides some definitions of variables commonly associated 
with the international migration literature, especially involving high-skilled workers in 
the IT industry. The third section describes some of the socio-economic characteristics 
of IT technical talent. The following section introduces some basic patterns of global 
migration in the world economy. The fifth section delves into the main motivations 
behind the movement of talent. Section six assesses the impact of mobility of technical 
talent on both sending and receiving countries. The next section analyzes the 
developmental impact of mobility on the IT industry. The final section briefly discusses 
some of the policy implications of the international mobility of technical talent.   2
2 Some  basic  concepts 
Defining ‘technical talent’ is problematic as it is linked to a range of technical skills. It 
is difficult to measure skills as a variety of factors contribute to skill development, such 
as work experience, length and type of training, formal education, and the nature of 
economic value of the work performed. Barring exceptional talent as in athletes, artists, 
and entertainers, high-skilled workers possess tertiary education of at least four years 
beyond the twelve years of primary and secondary education (Lowell and Findlay 2001: 
7). The reference to ‘technical’ suggests formal training and education in fields such as 
the sciences and engineering. Generally, a four-year university degree would be the 
requisite formal education to produce technical talent, but shorter vocational training 
could be included as well. The OECD includes technical talent under the broader 
category of ‘human resources in science and technology’ (HRST).1 This refers to 
physical and life sciences, engineering, social sciences, health, education, and business. 
Hence, managers, doctors, economists, and other professions requiring a college degree 
would be classified under HRST.2 For the purpose of this paper, technical talent will 
include high-skilled workers and HRST who at the minimum have a four-year tertiary 
science or engineering degree and who for all practical purposes are the key human 
resources for the information technology sector. 
Some IT professionals become entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, who are also 
highly mobile, especially between their home and adopted countries (see Saxenian 
2006). Most IT experts and entrepreneurs would have an engineering background in 
computer science, electronics, or software engineering; some may come from other 
broadly technical fields such as engineering and the sciences. A few could have non-
technical backgrounds with either a degree in computer applications with knowledge in 
programming or with extensive IT training or marketing skills who are familiar with the 
IT market. Generally, engineers with an MBA serve as consultants and other managerial 
positions within the IT industry. 
Two concepts are used to analyze the mobility of technical talent. They are stocks and 
flows. Similar to foreign direct investment (FDI), the stock of talent is measured at a 
given moment in time, while flows are measured over time. Also, there are both inflows 
and outflows of talent. Hence, net inflows (or outflows) capture better the direction of 
mobility of technical talent and the availability of skills for any given country over the 
year. Both stocks and flows are related, i.e. each year’s flows cumulatively add to the 
stock of technical talent for the receiving countries. Net flows by level of education 
suggest that those with higher professional qualifications tend to be more mobile than 
those with less education, though global migration also selectively includes less-skilled 
workers. Intuitively, net inflows of technical talent are positive for most OECD 
economies, while for developing countries such flows tend to be negative. However, 
with new opportunities in sending countries, net flows do not necessarily capture the 
more ‘circular’ movements of professionals between sending and receiving countries. 
                                                 
1   Research scientists form a subgroup but may overlap with other categories mentioned below (see 
Thorn and Holm-Nielsen 2006). 
2   Nurses do not fall in this category. However, healthcare workers are a significant category in 
analyzing international migration issues (see Blouin 2005).   3
A distinction needs to be made between temporary and permanent movement of talent. 
Foreign students pursuing university-based technical training constitute an important 
supply of future talent. Technically, foreign students are considered to be temporary 
visitors. However, the inflows of foreign students add to the future stock of talent in the 
receiving country should they not return home. As the demand for technical workers has 
been typically higher in OECD countries than in the non-OECD ones, it is inevitable 
that some students from developing countries seek employment in the host economies. 
At the same time, as employment opportunities increase in sending countries, the 
incentives for foreign students to return home also increase. Moreover, as the 
international outsourcing of IT services and design takes on greater prominence in 
global business strategy, the mobility of talent takes on a combination of temporary, 
permanent, and circulatory character. 
3  Characteristics of technical talent 
3.1 Education 
If technical talent is distinguished from other categories of workers by educational 
background in engineering and the sciences at the tertiary level, then countries with 
strong technical tertiary educational infrastructure are positioned well to generate 
technical talent. Governments explicitly pursuing industrialization with a science and 
technology policy have typically built up a good technical education system. As the 
global demand for technical professionals increases the national educational 
infrastructure tends to respond favourably to meet such demand. Thus science and 
technology spending contributes to the international mobility of technical talent 
(Solimano and Pollack 2004: 3). 
Technical talent at its core embodies both generic training in logic, mathematics, and 
software programming and specialization in particular technical fields such as 
electronics, computer science, mathematics, physics, and life sciences. The minimum 
qualification is a bachelor’s degree in engineering or the sciences, although there are 
demands also for master’s and Ph.D. degree holders. Many engineering students from 
India, China, and other developing countries obtain a bachelor’s degree at home and 
then a master’s or Ph.D. degree abroad to work as researchers in both commercial and 
non-profit, public institutions.3 
In India there are also non-engineering students who obtain technical training in IT 
through diploma programmes such as the Masters in Computer Applications (MCA). 
These graduates, along with non-engineers with mainly programming skills, also 
comprise technical talent. However, diploma holders tend to be less mobile 
internationally than engineers unless they have some solid ‘domain’ expertise such as in 
finance, retail, manufacturing, media and the entertainment industry, or supply chain 
management. Domain expertise is purely a function of work/project experience. 
Graduates with several years of experience in particular domains are highly sought 
                                                 
3   For most students from developing countries a four-year undergraduate overseas education would be 
financially prohibitive.   4
after. However, as a general rule, without a technical background entry into particular 
IT domains is difficult. 
3.2 Socio-demographic  characteristics 
Technical education is expensive as it requires four additional years of training. The 
opportunity costs are high but it promises higher expected returns over the lifetime of 
the graduate. It is also expensive in terms of national resource allocation. Resources 
devoted to tertiary education in developing countries means fewer resources in basic 
primary education. A political economy analysis of higher education would suggest that 
a class bias is inherent in tertiary education, and especially technical training, as it 
requires greater resources per student. However, as a matter of public policy and higher 
expected social returns, promoting higher education can be justified so long as basic 
education is not ignored. But who gets to pursue technical education? It is intuitively 
clear that in market-driven economies households already enjoying higher economic 
and social status and pre-disposed favourably toward higher education are the main 
beneficiaries of tertiary education. Early socialization toward higher education, 
reinforced by economic and social rewards of technical education, suggests a strong 
middle class bias in tertiary education. 
In developing countries professional training, especially technical education, is 
perceived as a gateway to well-paid employment. The economics of scarcity limits the 
entry of students in technical education as the demand for education exceeds the supply. 
Consequently, the premium associated with a degree from reputable technical colleges 
provides a generalized incentive for middle class students to pursue technical education. 
Given education’s public good characteristics and middle class aspirations, politically 
governments are compelled to subsidize technical education. The worldwide expansion 
of IT-related industries and the growing significance of the weightless economy suggest 
higher enrolments in technical training, especially in developing countries. 
In some countries such as India, the growth in technical education exhibits regional 
dimensions (D’Costa 2003a). The southern states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, 
and Andhra Pradesh, for historical and institutional reasons, have a better record on 
education in general compared to northern and eastern states. Both Karnataka and Tamil 
Nadu have further promoted technical education by deregulating engineering education. 
Low-income households and rural families can access higher technical education if they 
have a good secondary education, resources, and the willingness to risk current income 
for future returns. Affirmative action programmes attempt to address the pre-existing 
social and economic inequality. The reservations system in India gives preferences to 
historically and structurally oppressed scheduled castes and tribes for admissions to 
public universities and institutions of higher learning. 
The relative newness of high technology and the IT industry suggest that the stocks and 
flows of technical talent will be relatively young.4 Although the gender composition of 
                                                 
4   The average age of immigrants tends to be less than the receiving country population. However, 
Israel, which has immigration as a central policy for nation building, has been a recipient of older 
immigrants (Paltiel 2001: 167-8).   5
technical talent favours males over females, the IT industry is creating opportunities for 
women. The high education and intellectual content of software engineering, the social 
acceptability of white collar in general, and good remuneration make the IT industry 
attractive for technically trained women. 
3.3 Economic  characteristics 
Technical talent is prized because of the economic value it generates for firms and 
national economies. The relationship between education and income, though 
inconclusive at the general macroeconomic level, is intuitively strong at the sectoral 
level. Professionals with technical degrees are better placed to find employment in 
today’s globalizing economy fuelled by ICT than those with non-technical degrees. 
With experience the market value of technical professionals increases considerably in 
an industry characterized by growth and a relatively young workforce. It is evident that 
those with the right mix of education and skills can exploit the new opportunities. 
As with any economic activity, job-specific and firm-specific training is critical to 
transform the raw talent to meet particular project needs. The market value of talent 
increases with firm reputation, years of experience, and progressively more experience 
with the management of complex projects. Though specific technical skills are 
embodied in individuals, it is the experience gained through teamwork in projects that 
rewards technical professionals over time. Also, the salary structure of the IT industry 
reflects the complexities of the tasks done by IT professionals. For example, among 
engineers a programmer is at the lowest end of the job hierarchy in the IT industry, 
while project leader, project manager, network administrator, and systems integrator 
will be ranked much higher. Their salaries will vary considerably, depending on the 
position, years of experience, and nature of projects handled. Thus engineers 
programming for embedded software are likely to be paid more than those programming 
for banking software since greater technical skills are needed for embedded software. 
However, project execution for banking software could be equally challenging. 
Furthermore, salaries also vary by firm size and reputation and the extent to which firms 
provide bonus and employee stock options to its employees. 
High economic value for technical talent is justified by high labour productivity relative 
to other sectors, often measured in terms of revenues per employee. High value is also 
due to the increasingly ubiquitous nature of IT products and services in the new 
economy, which can be seen as an intermediate product and service, designed to 
facilitate the production of final goods and services. Furthermore, network externalities 
in the IT industry are also a significant driver of growth. As ICT diffuses so do the 
efficiencies in producing and using IT goods and services. This derived demand can be 
argued to be an important determinant of economic value of technical talent. High 
demand suggests high growth in compensation rates for talent and subsequently, ceteris 
paribus, a greater response by the technical education system to meet growing demand. 
This is especially the case when demand is externally generated, leading to outflows of 
talent, both temporarily and permanently. The large wage differential between OECD 
and developing countries in the context of high demand is a significant motivator of 
international migration.   6
4  Some global migration patterns 
Today, roughly 2.5 per cent of the global population of 6.1 billion lives outside their 
home countries, compared to 2.2 per cent in 1965 (Whitwell 2002: 5). What has 
changed are the patterns of migration, the relative significance of sending and receiving 
countries, the types of migration by occupation, skill, and duration, the macro and micro 
processes underway, and the impact on both sending and receiving countries in the 
context of global economic integration. There are many reasons for the movement of 
talent, including political, military, and economic. The break up of the Soviet Bloc and 
subsequent economic instability contributed to emigration from Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Ukraine and former eastern bloc countries to Russia and Russian Jews 
to the US, Israel, and Germany (Heleniak 2004). Military dictatorships in Latin America 
and the massacre in Tiananmen Square have also sparked outflows of talent (Solimano 
and Pollack 2004: 4; Whitwell 2002: 7). However, the mobility of highly skilled 
workers is increasingly determined by market demand and supply conditions and 
perceived economic and professional opportunities in the world economy. The IT 
industry is one such case. The ageing of societies is another development that is creating 
unprecedented demand for workers, especially in healthcare. 
4.1  International migration trends 
Based on the inflows of foreign population in OECD countries, the preferred 
destinations are Western Europe, North America, and Australia.5 Within the OECD 
Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, UK, and the US stand out as the most important 
destinations (OECD Migration Data Set). The main receiving countries are the larger 
OECD economies, while the sending countries include most of the developing world. 
However, not all movements of people are from non-OECD countries to the OECD. A 
good portion of migration for Europe is intra-European. Also, many Canadians work in 
the US, while engineers and computer scientists from non-OECD countries are attracted 
to Canada for immigration (Zhao et al. 2000: 8, 20; Wickramasekara 2002: 4). There is 
considerable migration within Asia and between Asia and the OECD economies (Hugo 
2003: 11). Australia receives most of its permanent settlers from New Zealand followed 
by the UK. For Germany, Italy was the fourth largest sender of nearly 30,000 in 2001, 
while for the UK it was the US and Australia that were the top senders of 47,000 and 
31,300 respectively. In the same year, the US sent over 20,000 people to Japan, just 
5,000 less than Korea. 
Barring these intra-OECD flows, the bulk of inflows to the OECD countries are from 
developing countries (Table 1). The patterns of inflows reflect historical, colonial, 
ethnic, and regional ties. It is not surprising that Morocco and Algeria are the largest 
sources of immigrants to France due to historic and colonial ties, and Albania is the 
principal supplier to Italy due to regional proximity. Due to colonial, linguistic, and 
regional ties Japan receives Chinese and Koreans; the UK receives Indians, Pakistanis, 
and Bangladeshis; while common ethnicity attracts Americans and Australians to the 
UK. Similarly, French-speaking North Africans prefer to emigrate to France, while 
English-speaking South Asians, prefer Canada, the UK, the US, and Australia. 
                                                 
5   The measurement methods vary by country hence the data on foreign population are not strictly 
comparable.   7
Emigration rates vary, with very poor countries sending relatively more skilled people. 
For example, Haiti, Somalia, Ghana, and Mozambique were the top four among 30 
countries with the highest sending rates, whereas Sweden, Egypt, China, and India were 
ranked the top four among the group of 30 with the lowest rates (Docquier and Rapoport 
2004: 9). Among non-OECD countries, middle-income countries display a greater 
propensity to send skilled migrants, while large developing countries with a larger 
absolute pool of talent tend to have lower emigration rates. Latin American countries 
such as Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Costa Rica fall within this group 
(OECD 2005: 129). However, their reasons for low rates are not necessarily because of 
large pools of technical talent (except perhaps Brazil) or growing professional 
opportunities at home. Rather it is likely influenced by the limited availability of high 
quality technical education infrastructures. 
4.2  Migration trends of high-skilled workers 
The biggest sources of non-OECD expatriate communities in OECD countries are ‘the 
former Soviet Union (4.2 million people), former Yugoslavia (2.2 million), India (1.9 
million), the Philippines (1.8 million), China (1.7 million), Vietnam (1.5 million), 
Morocco (1.4 million), and Puerto Rico (1.3 million)’ (OECD 2005: 127). Among them, 
the former Soviet Union and India had the largest numbers of expatriates with tertiary 
education – 1.3 and 1.0 million respectively (OECD 2005: 127). The share of high-skill 
expatriate populations from non-OECD countries is presented in Table 2. 
Countries with more than 500,000 expatriates show a range of high skill expatriate 
intensities (number of skilled expatriates as a share of total expatriates). In other words, 
not all countries with a large absolute number of expatriates have a big share of high-
skilled expatriates. Conversely, countries with few expatriates could have a high 
concentration of the highly skilled. The reasons are simple. Wars, ethnic conflicts, and 
political upheavals often lead to a large expatriate population with a small share of 
highly skilled professionals. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
and El Salvador are three such examples. Other countries such as Iran, plagued with 
political uncertainties, have a high share of skilled expatriates (45.6 per cent) (Table 2). 
Small countries such as Cuba and the Dominican Republic, with their proximity to the 
US, are also large sources of expatriate populations. Cuban expatriates in the US tend to 
be highly skilled. Mexico, on the other hand, with over 8 million expatriates in the US 
had a highly skilled share of only 6 per cent. Historical ties as well as earlier Japanese 
migration to Brazil have made contemporary Brazilian emigration directed more toward 
Western Europe and Japan. Turkey’s easy access to the German economy through the 
guest worker programme has contributed to a large number of expatriates but with a low 
concentration of high skilled workers (6.3 per cent). Smaller countries send out fewer 
people but contribute a greater portion of high skills. Most former East European 
countries, with advanced technical education systems, would fall in this group.  
The highest concentration of highly skilled expatriates is found among Asian countries. 
They include Hong Kong, China, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
Most of these countries are poor but have large pools of technical talent. For example, 
80 per cent of Indians and 54 per cent of Chinese immigrants to OECD aged 25 and 
above had tertiary education (Chalamwong 2004: 5). These countries can be expected to 
send out large numbers of high skilled people and have a high concentration of highly 
skilled expatriates. India, with nearly 2 million expatriates, had a concentration of 52   8
per cent, the Philippines with a similar expatriate population had a concentration of 48 
per cent, and China, with 1.6 million, had a share of 40 per cent. Taiwan had the highest 
concentration with 61 per cent due to its rapid industrial development based on 
technical education. 
5  Main motivations behind mobility 
5.1  Structural demand and supply factors 
The decision to move to a new country is mostly an individual or a household one but 
one that is embedded in the wider structural and community context. At the 
individual/family level emigration is a response to better economic opportunities, 
significantly influenced by responses of and feedback from earlier emigrants. In 
neoclassical terms this is interpreted as choosing the higher returns to marginal 
productivity in the richer, receiving country over the lower returns in the poorer, 
sending country.6 However, the global labour market does not function so smoothly. It 
is highly regulated through national immigration policies. Structurally, the ever-
increasing technology- and knowledge-intensive activities within the ambit of a new 
‘weightless’ economy are generating higher demand for talent. The rapid development 
of electronics and digital technologies (convergence technologies) and their diffusion 
has contributed to the global demand for technical talent and thus inflows of high-
skilled workers to OECD economies. 
Economic integration also influences the global supply and demand of talent. As 
multinational firms organize production globally they also recruit professionals globally 
and engage in intra-company transfers of human resources and technical talent. In 1996 
the UK and the US registered 13,000 and 32,000 intra-company transfers respectively 
(OECD 2005: 36). In 2002, the numbers were 19,000 and 58,000. Regional free trade 
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also 
encourage the movement of talent among member countries. For example, university 
educated Canadian workers could work in the US under a NAFTA temporary visa 
system (Zhao et al. 2000:13). With tight control over their subsidiaries, Japanese 
companies also contributed to intra-company transfers as currency appreciation and 
rising wage costs compelled shifting production to East and South East Asian countries 
in the 1980s. 
Mobility is also influenced by labour shortages in OECD economies due to declining 
fertility rates, ageing societies, increasing dependency ratios, and tight immigration 
policies. High-income countries already have low population growth and are expected 
to fall further in the next decade (Table 3). For example, Japan is expected to witness 
negative population growth rate of –0.2 per cent over the 2001-15 period. The non-
OCED countries have a higher population growth rate with a much younger 
population.7 Those that have a large pool of technical workers are likely to remain 
major sending countries for the foreseeable future. Post-Second World War 
                                                 
6   For a critique of the neoclassical interpretation, relying on economistic ‘pull and push’ factors of 
international migration, see Massey et al. (1998). 
7   In 2000, Switzerland faced a shortage of 10,000 IT workers (Page 2003: 208).   9
industrialization efforts by large developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil 
unwittingly contributed to a large technical pool. However, the exhaustion of 
industrialization in the context of low economic growth failed to absorb such talent in 
remunerative and professionally challenging assignments. Limited professional 
opportunities, unemployment, and low salaries led to the emigration of technical talent 
from most developing countries. More recently in the 1990s, the economic crisis in 
Latin America generated substantial underutilization of technical talent at home and the 
US remained the main destination for the region (Barrere et al. 2004: 29). In the context 
of global shortages, competition, and intensified economic integration the outflows of 
talent from non-OECD countries have become structurally more pronounced.8 
Technical education and foreign degrees are perceived to enhance employment 
prospects in poor countries. However, unlike previous outflows of students, the 
magnitude of flows has increased with fewer students returning home. Thus, over time, 
non-OECD economies are contributing to the stocks of talent in OECD countries by 
immigration and student flows are adding to the future stocks. With declining 
enrolments in science and technology fields in several OECD countries de facto 
opportunities have emerged for foreign students (see Department of Education data in 
Watts 2001:149). The stocks of foreign students, from non-OECD countries in selected 
OECD economies, are presented in Table 4. The US remains the largest destination for 
students, with the UK as a distant second. Smaller European economies tend to have 
smaller shares of non-OECD students.9 Latin America remains a small source for 
foreign students in OECD countries as not one country from the region was mentioned 
in a list of main countries by origin of foreign students (Tremblay 2002: 53). 
The movement of technical talent is visible from the increasing number of foreign-born 
scientists and engineers (S&E) in the US civilian labour force (Espenshade 2001: 137). 
In 1970, foreign-born scientists and engineers represented 7.6 per cent compared to 11.4 
per cent in 1990 and 14.8 per cent in 1997. Between 1970 and 1997, the total number of 
native-born and foreign-born S&E increased by 124 per cent and 373 per cent 
respectively (Espenshade 2001: 137). Based on National Science Foundation data, over 
50 per cent of science and engineering students of Indian nationality planned to remain 
in the US, suggesting a growing stock of (Indian) talent in the US. Such expansion 
reflects the structural shift in the US economy, skill shortages, and the corresponding 
demand increases in technical talent.10 
                                                 
8   Even western Germany, not known for Chinese immigrants, is increasingly employing highly skilled 
workers in auto and electrical engineering industries (Giese 2003: 169). 
9   The US is attractive for students because of excellent, post-baccalaureate science and engineering 
programmes in large, well-endowed university systems, financial assistance for students, professional 
opportunities, and, until recently, a very receptive attitude toward foreign students based on the 
broader liberal political culture. English-speaking students find it easy to adjust to the American social 
environment. Nearly 50 per cent of permanent residents do not become citizens, indicating few 
differences in benefits for citizens and non-citizens (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004: 21).  
10  It is difficult to estimate labour shortages but rising wage growth could reflect such shortages. But the 
ready availability of technical talent from abroad could check the rise in US salaries. Alternatively, if 
wages for technical talent are rising in India, which is an important supplier of talent to the US, then 
shortages in the US can be indirectly inferred.   10
It is not clear why most Latin American countries had higher rates of return than both 
India and China. For example, in 2001 Brazil had 70 per cent rate of return of its 1996 
US-trained Ph.D.s, while Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina all exceeded 
Indian and Chinese rates as well (Thorn and Holm-Nielsen 2006). Economic 
opportunities at home alone cannot explain this as recent Latin American economic 
performance has been unremarkable. Most likely, technical education is not as popular 
as in Asia as evidenced by few Latin American students in OECD countries. Of the 
nearly 600,000 foreign students in the US in 2001-02, only 12 per cent came from Latin 
America compared to 56 per cent from Asia (Barrere et al. 2004: 36). Possibly, 
language affinity makes it more attractive for Latin American students to selectively go 
to Spain, where 15 per cent of foreign students were from Latin America (ibid: 35). 
Also, there may be greater cultural disposition toward the US by Chinese and Indian 
technical talent and their ethnic-based networks may further reinforce this bias. 
Alternatively, the small number of highly qualified professionals in Latin America 
makes it easier for them to return or they are crowded out by a larger, and often better 
qualified, pool of Asian talent. This is evident from US data on human resources in 
science and technology R&D. It shows that less than 1 per cent of the total R&D 
workforce is from South America compared to more than 10 per cent from Asia 
(Barrere et al. 2004: 37).11 
Salary differentials alone do not explain international mobility. Challenging 
assignments, favourable working conditions, and access to relevant peer groups are 
significant professional factors that influence mobility. For example, the huge disparity 
in research and development expenditures between rich and poor countries, roughly to 
the tune of 16 per cent versus 84 per cent respectively, is a strong incentive for talent to 
emigrate (Solimano and Pollack 2004: 5). Budget cuts in science and technology areas 
have compelled Russian talent to emigrate to Germany and Israel (Solimano 2002: 10). 
Foreign scientists in Italy have sought professional opportunities and invitations from 
their colleagues partly because of professional peers (Brandi and Cerba 2004: 2). Also, 
rigid business regulations may also drive out entrepreneurial talent to more business-
friendly environments. Of the many Indian business families operating overseas two 
groups who have made their mark by leaving India are the Mittal brothers and Swaraj 
Paul of Caparo Industries based in the UK. Both are in metals-based industry, with the 
Mittal family owning the world’s largest steel company (see D’Costa 1999). The 
presence of highly successful Indian and Chinese entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley also 
testifies to the significance of professional peers, networking, a conducive business 
climate, and commercial opportunities available in global settings (Saxenian 2003). 
5.2 Immigration  policies 
The relaxation of immigration policies for skilled workers in recent years is also 
encouraging mobility (Cornelius and Espenshade 2001: 3-7).12 Many OECD countries 
have special programmes for recruitment and permanent residence for students and 
workers (OECD 2003: Annex 1). Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Korea, 
                                                 
11  As noted by Barrere et al. (2004: 30), generally ‘Latin American emigrants to the US are less educated 
than natives, and than [sic] Asian, African, and European immigrants’. 
12  However, Indian IT professionals continue to face a host of barriers to work abroad (Parikh 2003).   11
the Netherlands, and the UK have special programmes or simplified procedures for 
permanent immigration or extended temporary stays specifically for IT and software 
engineers. The UK gives preferential treatment for IT workers and fast tracks permits 
for them (Martineau et al. 2002: 14). As of 2001, holders of student visa in Austria, 
France, and Korea who graduate in IT fields can favourably change their residency 
status. Canada also targets high-skilled workers, as evidenced by a higher proportion of 
advanced engineering degrees held by foreigners than by Canadian-born (Boyd and 
Thomas 2001: 117). Germany introduced its Green Card Programme in 2001 
specifically for ICT workers (Giese 2003: 170) and Lufthansa established a direct flight 
between Bangalore and Frankfurt.13 Even Japan has relaxed visa regulations for Indian 
IT workers from a single entry, three-month visa to a multiple entry three-year visa 
(personal interviews with Japanese embassy staff, New Delhi, March 2005). 
The US is the most important player in attracting global talent. It has a permanent 
immigration programme through an employment-based system of professionals with 
advanced degrees in science and technology. Under this category of employment there 
is a quota of 140,000 entries per year, including the reunion of family members. To 
meet the demand for IT workers, the US also has several temporary work visa 
programmes. Under the American Competitiveness and Work Force Improvement Act 
of 1998 temporary inflows of technical talent are facilitated through the H-1B visa 
programme. The visa is employment-based, valid for a maximum of six years; the 
applicant must have a bachelor’s degree. The Immigration Act of 1990 permits the 
adjustment of temporary H-1B visa to an immigrant status as the applicants continue to 
be in jobs that are permanent (Lowell 2001: 50). The annual quotas are politically 
determined, with 65,000 visas distributed annually prior to 1999. The quota was 
increased to 115,000 in 1999 and 2000, 107,500 in 2001, and back to 65,000 thereafter. 
But it was raised to 195,000 for 2001, 2002, and 2003 before reverting back to 65,000 
(Watts 2001: 144, Desai et al. 2003: 7). The actual number of H-1B visas granted has 
increased significantly in recent years (Table 5). 
The temporary H-1B visas contribute directly and immediately to the concerned 
industries deploying such talent. Asians have been significant in the US IT industry 
(Espenshade 2001: 138). In 2003, roughly one-third of H-1B visas were granted to 
Europeans and 40 per cent to Asians. The principal recipients among Asian countries 
were India, China, Japan and the Philippines. India garnered 21 per cent of the total and 
54 per cent of the Asian share of H-1Bs, far ahead of other competing Asian countries 
(Table 6). Indian firms have successfully leveraged the US immigration system, 
exporting talent in large numbers. Of the 331,206 H-1B visas approved in 2001, 49 per 
cent went to Indian professionals, and of these 92 per cent were IT related (Hira 2004: 
842). The Indian experience contrasts sharply with the Mexican and Brazilian ones 
(Alarcón 2001: 248). In 1994, India received 16 per cent of all H-1B visas compared to 
Mexico’s 2.6 per cent and Brazil’s 2.2 per cent.14 In 2002, South America as a whole 
                                                 
13  However, Germany has been unsuccessful in attracting Indian IT professionals due to cultural barriers 
and rigid conditions attached to temporary movement of talent (Cornelius and Espenshade 2001: 
11-12). Evidently other countries are more attractive to Indian professionals (Cornelius and Tsuda 
2004: 28).  
14    More telling is the data on immigrants admitted by occupation and country of birth. Under the 
‘professional and technical’ and ‘executive, administrative, and managerial’ groups, India’s shares in   12
received less than 2 per cent of IT-related H-1B visas compared to Asia’s 83 per cent 
(Barrere et al. 2004: 33). The Immigration Act of 1990 permits holders of a temporary 
H-1B visa to change to immigrant status if they continue in permanent jobs (Lowell 
2001: 50). 
Immigration policies have been also relaxed with increased trade and FDI, allowing 
more intra-company transfers under the L1 visa programme. Though small in absolute 
terms, Latin American countries during 1996-2002 increased talent outflows through 
intra-company transfers nearly four times to 37,082 (Barrere et al. 2004: 35). Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela increased such outflows nearly four, two, four, 
seven, and four times during this period. However, strong commercial ties with the US 
meant that the UK, Japan, Germany, and increasingly India (IT-based) secured the 
highest numbers of US visas for intra-company transfers (ibid: 34). Akin to the L1 
programme, albeit on a smaller scale, trade-related Trade NAFTA (TN) work visas for 
professionals are extended to NAFTA members such as Mexico and Canada. However, 
visas are waived for Canadian TN professionals (Lowell 2001: 40). 
Visas quotas both for students in academic programmes and for professionals coming to 
work have been high, albeit lower since 11 September 2001. Students contribute to the 
stock of high skills and set the movement of talent in motion (Wickramasekara 2002: 4). 
Asian students dominate technical education in OECD economies. For example, in 
2001, nearly 47,000 Indian students went to the US, accounting for 78 per cent of all 
Indian students enrolled in OECD countries (Khadria 2004: 29). In 1999 Indians had the 
largest number of science and engineering degree holders among foreign residents in the 
US and 30,000 science and engineering doctorates.15 Europe’s share of foreign students 
in the US was 18 per cent compared to Asia’s 55 per cent. Among Asian countries, 
Japan had 24 per cent, Korea 21 per cent, China 16 per cent, and India 15 per cent (US 
Department of Homeland Security 2004: 89-92). The share of Central and South 
America was only 9 per cent, with Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela contributing 50 per 
cent of the regions’ share. Mexico, on the other hand, despite its proximity to the US, 
sent about twenty-three thousand students in 2003, with very few in the high technology 
areas (see Alarcón 2001: 240). Even US born Hispanics have the lowest rates of 
participation in technical occupations in the US. Together India and China account for 
roughly 25 per cent of all non-native scientists and engineers in the US (Espenshade 
2001: 138). 
5.3  Business models and the movement of technical talent 
While international mobility of technical talent is partly explained by immigration 
policies, foreign student enrolments, and different types of visas granted, the adoption 
of a particular business model also explains the temporary movement of talent in the IT 
industry. For example, outsourcing of software services to India by mainly American 
companies is illustrative. It began with on-site services in the US, where workers 
temporarily moved to the client’s site and provided software programming services, 
                                                                                                                                               
1994 were 17.8 and 5.1 per cent respectively compared to Mexico’s 0.8 and 0.4 per cent (Alarcón 
2001: 256).  
15  Additionally, as Indians are prominent in higher education establishments in the US, it also suggests a 
visible and influential talent pool.   13
conversions, maintenance of software and hardware, debugging, testing and limited 
systems integration (D’Costa 2002). However, profits for the Indian firm was not high 
since pricing was based on time and materials costs, which included the high cost of 
living incurred by Indian talent living at the foreign client’s site (D’Costa 2003b: 67). 
This model of outsourcing gave way to more software development in India. Gradually 
on-site services decreased due to reduced Y2K needs and due to India’s growing 
technological maturity. The new export model is offshore development whereby Indian 
companies develop the software in India and transfer it via satellite to their US clients 
abroad. Between 1999 and 2003, the share of offshore delivery of services increased 
from 35 per cent to 58 per cent, while on-site services fell from 57 per cent to 39 per 
cent (NASSCOM 2004), thus reducing the movement of people. However, with the 
absolute increase of nearly 90 per cent in the volume of on-site services during this 
period, the temporary movement of workers to market, develop, test, implement, 
maintain, upgrade services, and interface with clients became significant. As overseas 
markets become more mature the near-permanent presence of highly skilled marketing 
and technical professionals abroad becomes critical to offshore development. This 
heightens demand for IT workers and correspondingly encourages mobility. Hence, the 
rise in H-1B and L1 visas in the US is very much tied to the business models adopted in 
the IT industry. The mobility of technical talent to clients’ sites, while temporary in 
nature, creates professional opportunities for on-site engineers to remain permanently.16 
The growth of offshore business model suggests that technical talent will increasingly 
remain in the sending country but the increasing volume of total global business 
suggests that absolutely more workers will be needed for on-site services. 
Consequently, as the diaspora network expands, greater learning is possible by both 
expatriates and residents as mobility among them heightens (Kuznetsov and Sabel 2006; 
Thorn and Holm-Nielsen 2006). 
6  The impact of mobility on the IT sector 
Without detailed empirical investigation it is difficult to predict the long-term effects of 
mobility (see Winters 2003). The impacts of the mobility of highly skilled workers in 
both receiving and sending countries are felt at many levels (Solimano and Pollack 
2004: 13), and quite negatively in some sending countries (Wickramasekara 2002: 7). 
There are three kinds of broadly interrelated effects on both sending and receiving 
countries—economic, political, and social. Under the first there are income, wealth, 
human capital, and innovative capability effects. These are felt both in the short- and 
medium-term and can be both positive and negative (see Figure 1). The political effects 
in the receiving countries can result in jingoist posturing and job losses, especially if 
non-OECD talent is perceived as taking away high-skill jobs in the rich countries. There 
                                                 
16  In Japan, I came across many Indian IT professionals who came as on-site engineers for an Indian 
vendor and later joined the Japanese client as an employee. There is another institutional reason by 
which international mobility of IT workers is influenced. For example, Japanese businesses have a 
greater propensity to interact with their suppliers and vendors, hence should Japanese firms decide to 
outsource internationally they would prefer to have more Indian workers on-site. Consequently, there 
would be greater temporary movement of talent, ceteris paribus. Anecdotal information suggests a 10 
per cent on-site ratio for US offshore projects in India compared to Japan’s 20 per cent (field research, 
Japan, April–June 2005).   14
are several social effects of the movement of talent but three deserve scrutiny, namely 
the formation of epistemic networks, their links to sending countries’ innovative 
capability, and inequality. 
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6.1 Impact on sending economies 
The most discussed impact of the outflow of technical talent on sending countries has 
been brain drain.17 It arguably entails a loss of skills and thus future innovative 
capability and waste of public investments because of the relatively high cost of 
subsidized tertiary technical education (Solimano and Pollack 2004: 13).18 The 1970s 
had already witnessed a serious drain of talent from developing countries and today 
many African countries suffer from the emigration of technical professionals and 
healthcare workers. For example, between 1985 and 1990 Africa lost 60,000 
professionals through emigration (Wickramasekara 2002: 5). With the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there has been an outflow of scientists, 
engineers, and academics abroad. Between 1989 and 2002, roughly 22,000 scientists 
from Russia’s R&D sector emigrated abroad (Nekipelova and Ledeneva 2004; Wolberg 
2000: 11). The OECD economies absorbed most of the Russians, with the US, 
                                                 
17  For a review of models of brain drain see Commander et al. (2004: 241-5). 
18  However, waste is reduced if, training and education costs are borne privately, as it is often the case 
with Indian IT workers (Gayathri 2001).   15
Germany, and France accounting for nearly 55 per cent of Russian scientific workforce 
abroad. In 2000 Germany and Israel accounted for 86 per cent of science and 
technology Russian emigrants (Gokhberg and Nekipelova 2001: 180).19 
One favourable effect of mobility on sending countries is remittance income flows 
(Table 7).20 Low-income and small economies tend to benefit the most from 
remittances as they contribute substantially to national income, complement sparse FDI, 
and in general provide scarce foreign exchange, which could be used for economic 
development purposes (D’Costa 2004). Female workers from Sri Lanka and Philippines 
contribute considerably to remittance income (Hugo 2003: 15). A recent World Bank 
estimate put the total remittance inflows to developing countries at $126 billion in 
2004.21 However, the propensity to remit is likely to be inversely related to skill levels 
as evidenced by Mexican workers and Indian IT workers in the US and from Indian un-
skilled and semi-skilled workers in West Asian countries. There is little economic 
compulsion to send money home by middle-class Indian IT professionals (Kapur 2003: 
14). 
However, as OECD demand for talent grows the large-scale emigration of high-skilled 
workers could lower economic growth and raise poverty in the sending country, 
especially if the share of outflows relative to the stock of the sending country’s talent is 
high. India and China, which contribute temporary workers through employment visas 
and to the permanent stocks as students, do not feel the negative impact of migration 
because they are among the 15 countries with the smallest shares of highly skilled aged 
15-plus expatriates in OECD countries with 3.1 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively, 
(OECD 2005:129). Emigration of the highly skilled could lower productivity and lower 
economic growth, if the ratio of expatriate skilled population to the stock of sending 
country is very high. Related, there could be increasing inequality as wages for those 
who remain in skill-demanding sectors rise relative to the less skill-demanding sectors 
(Lowell and Findlay 2001: 7; D’Costa 2003a, 2003c). 
Several other outcomes are possible. If the movement of talent translates into higher 
incomes for those who emigrate, the resulting relative scarcity of local talent could also 
lead to an upward wage spiral. This is a good outcome as higher income growth is likely 
to contribute to economic growth. However, given the industry structure of the IT sector 
in India, a wage-cost push can create competitive pressures on small and medium 
enterprises, who could get crowded out by the larger domestic and multinational firms. 
The second effect of emigration of talent or student outflows is the high elasticity of 
local educational infrastructure to respond to the needs of the IT industry at home and 
abroad. A cursory examination of the technical education system in India, and 
                                                 
19  The share of highly skilled immigrants relative to all immigrants (skill ratio) has been high for Eastern 
European countries (Straubhaar 2000: 12-13; also Malaha 2004: 3). 
20  At the community level large remittance incomes could increase dependency and encourage excessive 
consumption (Kapur 2003: 20). 
21  The inflow of remittances received by developing countries is highly uneven and tend to be centred in 
a handful of economies. Most of the remittances to developing countries are received by a small 
number of them. National central bank data shows that in 2000, India, Mexico, Philippines, China, 
Turkey, and Egypt secured the bulk of remittances to their corresponding regions (Orozco 2003 in 
Sorensen 2004). Together they received 50 per cent of all remittances, with India capturing 15 per 
cent of the global share (D’Costa 2004).   16
particularly in Karnataka state, suggests that emigration and its subsequent economic 
rewards creates the incentives for workers to seek higher skills (D’Costa 2005; Winters 
2003). This is also evident in the Philippines where the share of mathematics and 
computer science graduates between 1995 and 2000 increased from 7 to 10 per cent of 
all tertiary graduates (Chalamwong 2004: 24). The outflow of talent also suggests 
increased links with export markets and research institutions abroad and significant 
gains in managerial and technical experience. 
There is a fiscal impact on sending countries. Thus for India, it has been estimated that 
‘net fiscal loss associated with the Indian-born resident population ranges from 0.24 per 
cent to 0.58 per cent of Indian GDP in 2001’ (Desai et al. 2003). However, the 
economic benefits derived from network effects could outweigh fiscal losses. Consider 
the resident Indian technical talent in Silicon Valley, which has been instrumental in 
creating an Indian brand name in IT services. Consequently, with the spread of the 
offshore model these Indian engineers are also spearheading investments in India (FDI) 
and exporting software services from India (trade). Investments and exports of software 
services combined with domestic market growth have contributed roughly 4 per cent of 
Indian GDP (NASSCOM 2005). India’s reputation in IT services is also recognized in 
Japan, a country still not quite ready for large-scale immigration, as many Indian 
engineers are training their Japanese counterparts in software engineering and quality 
processes (field research, Japan, May–June 2005). 
6.2  Effects on receiving countries 
The immediate impact on receiving countries is the meeting of shortages with 
subsidized technical talent and maintaining industry profitability. There is considerable 
debate over IT worker shortages. In Canada the shortages were estimated at 20,000 in 
the mid-1990s compared to US-estimated shortages of 190,000 (Zhao et al. 2000: 9). 
Other countries such as Australia and Singapore also exhibit shortages of IT labour as 
evidenced by inflows of IT workers from Malaysia, China, and other neighbouring 
countries (Solimano and Pollack 2004: 4). Receiving countries more than make up for 
their inability to generate talent at home and enhance the quality of the national 
workforce, as the Russians did for Israel (Solimano 2001: 9). The inflows of numerous 
students, such as in the US, also add to the future stock of talent and entrepreneurship 
(Solimano 2002: 9). In early 2001 it was estimated that there were one million Indian-
born individuals in the US and more than 75 per cent of the working age population had 
a bachelor’s degree or better (Desai et al. 2003: 1). Thirty-eight per cent of India-born 
US working age residents had post-graduate degrees compared with 9 per cent of US-
born residents. It has been estimated that the US government annually collects nearly 
$22.5 billion in payroll taxes from Indian H-1B visa holders alone (Desai et al. 2002). 
Indian and Chinese engineer-entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley have generated 
considerable employment (Lowell 2001: 34-5; Saxenian 1999). The availability of 
foreign talent also facilitates the upgrading of economic activities from low-value 
production to high-value activities consistent with the new economy. These include 
research and development, design and development, and entrepreneurship. Receiving 
countries such as the US, UK, and Australia also benefit from foreign students who pay 
for their education. Earlier estimates show that inflows of over $7 billion went into the 
US education system each year (Straubhaar 2000: 8). The export of education services 
by the US also means that it is setting up the preconditions for future brain gain.   17
When it comes to political impact, even liberal governments are acutely sensitive to 
local pressures for protectionist policies. An election year, a slow growing economy, 
widening trade deficits, and rising unemployment could all contribute to xenophobic 
sentiments and be attributed to foreign workers. The benefits of inflows of foreign talent 
are not visible to those who might lose their jobs. The argument that job losses could 
result from structural, cyclical, and technological factors rather than simply from 
foreign competition is not appreciated by those who become unemployed in the new 
economy. Relying on foreign talent could depress compensation of OECD IT workers. 
Many labour groups in the US argue that there are no shortages by pointing out to 
layoffs in the IT industry. But this interpretation overlooks the fact that it is older 
workers experienced in older technologies that face the brunt of layoffs. Foreign 
workers such as Indian software professionals are keeping abreast with recent IT 
technologies such as java and dot.net, while older workers in receiving countries are 
not. The strategy of US firms is to rely on new skills rather than experienced talent 
because of short product cycles, whereas India, as a follower, needs more experienced 
talent. India as a latecomer has the advantage of an abundance of young engineers 
trained in new technologies. Consequently, multinational IT companies prefer to hire 
young, technologically savvy professionals rather than retrain existing workers (Watts 
2001: 145, 151). 
Receiving countries can also experience increasing inequality although the precise 
mechanisms for this outcome are complex. On the one hand, hyper-competition 
associated with globalization means only those with the appropriate technical and 
commercial skills can be absorbed in the new economy while the less educated, 
unskilled, and semi-skilled are likely to remain at the bottom of the economic hierarchy 
(Castells 1998; D’Costa 2003c). But the inflows of technical talent could stem wage 
growth in receiving countries and contribute to salary convergence at the global-sectoral 
level. For certain high level IT professionals the salary gap between Silicon Valley and 
Bangalore has narrowed. The net effect of this double movement is global polarization 
in which the divide between the best IT professionals worldwide (along with other high-
skilled professionals) and the rest becomes acute. This polarization is further 
accentuated by greater returns to business and shareholders in receiving countries 
through global outsourcing arrangements. 
Since less-privileged minorities such as African-Americans and Hispanics in the US are 
already handicapped in terms of tertiary technical education and high skills, it is 
possible that a shift in social and ethnic balance might become more pronounced with 
the inflows of technical talent (D’Costa 2003c). Many foreign students take up 
underpaid postdoctoral work thereby compressing wage growth for such activities, 
which could discourage natives from taking up science and engineering education. But 
just as there is little evidence that immigrants lower wages or employment (Martin et al. 
2002: 9-10), it remains to be empirically verified whether minorities are discouraged 
from long-term postdoctoral science and engineering education due to the prevalence of 
foreign-born technical talent working for low economic returns. 
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7  The principal developmental effects 
The key developmental effects are economic but some of them work through non-
economic processes such as human capital development and epistemic networks. Three 
major developmental effects, remittance income, human capital development, and 
epistemic communities are discussed below. 
7.1 Remittance  income 
The outflows of talent could result in some inflows of remittance income in the form of 
foreign exchange (Lucas 2004; Hugo 2003: 19-20). Such income could complement 
domestic resources and boost the overall investment climate. The investment and 
entrepreneurship relationship is best evidenced by the fact that overseas Chinese 
contribute nearly 50 per cent of China’s FDI (Hugo 2003: 15). The ability to meet 
international debt obligations also suggests that more resources are available for 
developmental purposes. Export IT products and services have similar favourable 
outcomes. However, a rapid rate of foreign exchange accumulation could in the short-
term lead to an appreciation of the local currency and thus reduce international 
competitiveness (the Dutch disease syndrome) of other export sectors. Both India and 
China are increasingly faced with upward pressures on their currencies. However, few 
countries are in such an envious position.22 Their development problems stem less from 
excessive foreign exchange reserves and more from uncompetitive industries due to 
poor technology, education, and skills. 
At the household level remittances have a significant impact on the standard of living 
through increased consumption expenditures, which include children’s education and 
better healthcare (Raihan 2004). The downside to this development could be the 
government’s reliance on private remittance income to finance social expenditures such 
as basic healthcare. Remittance income could also contribute to local entrepreneurship 
based on the substantial savings from overseas employment. For example, in both 
Mexico and Egypt, savings from remittance income have contributed to local business 
development (Latapi 2004; Wahba 2003). However, these activities are likely to remain 
small, scattered, and inconsequential beyond the immediate households, their extended 
families, and local markets. Additionally, remittance income is like windfall gain 
relative to those who do not have remittance earnings from abroad. This could 
encourage increased consumerism and induce social inequality (D’Costa 2003c; Ratha 
2003). It could also result in localized inflation, especially for housing. 
7.2  Human capital development 
The outflows of talent could have a favourable impact on local wages if the local labour 
market is already tight. Nayyar (1994) argues that the macroeconomic impact of 
emigration from India is insignificant due to the large number of educated unemployed. 
However, particular regions and sectors could face labour shortages if the rate of worker 
                                                 
22   Lucas (2004) suggests that the Dutch disease was in operation for countries such as Albania and 
Moldova due to large inflows of remittances during their transition to market economies. D’Costa 
(2003b) hints at this possibility with India’s success with IT service exports.   19
outflow is high.23 The exodus of young Indian engineers to the US and other OECD 
economies and the massive demand for such professionals in India and abroad could put 
an upward pressure on wages and salaries, even beyond the IT sector. There is a 
migration premium, which predicts that more years of education and the prospect of 
working abroad enhance expected income two to five times in purchasing power parity 
values (Commander et al. 2004). More importantly, there are positive spillovers 
(technological externalities) with skill development since not all knowledge can be 
internalized or privatized (Straubhaar 2000: 17). 
The high demand for technical and managerial talent in the world market, marked by 
emigration, contributes to several externalities. On the positive side, international 
mobility sets off a virtuous cycle of increased demand for technical talent, which 
prompts growth in the tertiary education system and thus raises the local skill base of 
the economy. From the demand side there is an overall increase in economic activities 
due to remittance flows and high incomes earned. On the negative side, not all sectors 
or social groups participate with the same intensity, thereby experiencing unequal 
outcomes (D’Costa 2003a). The growth of the IT sector in the context of bottlenecks in 
the supply of talent suggests that in the short and medium term the non-IT sectors could 
be crowded out. But in the long haul, the continued permanent emigration and the 
temporary movement of technical talent are likely to make individuals seek technical 
training and the educational system to meet the demand for both global and local 
technical talent. Many Asian sending countries, especially China, India, and Taiwan 
have responded favourably toward higher technical education by establishing education 
and research centres as well as technology parks. 
Since 1990 India’s employment of IT professionals has increased from 56,000 to 
522,250, a nearly ten-fold growth (NASSCOM 2002: 63). Technical education in India 
has consistently expanded throughout the 1990s, with engineering admissions 
increasing five-fold between 1992 and 2004. The number of IT admissions based on 
capacity increased from 73,000 students in 1992 to 342,000 in 2004, while the number 
of professionals with an engineering degree is expected to increase from 43,000 in 1997 
to nearly 100,000 in 2004. Such growth is a major contributor to the stock and flows of 
Indian talent. 
7.3 Epistemic  communities 
In contrast to earlier brain drain arguments, today international mobility of technical 
talent is optimistically viewed as contributing to epistemic (knowledge) networks 
(Solimano and Pollack 2004: 12). They are seen as repositories of talent to be secured in 
the future. For example, non-resident Indians (NRIs) are perceived as important sources 
of remittance income, investment funds, and technical knowledge for India. Rather than 
anticipate a permanent loss, emigrants are perceived as possible return migrants or in 
circulation between the receiving and sending countries. In the IT industry, The Indus 
Entrepreneurs (TiE) is one such formal organization. Started in Silicon Valley in 1992 
by Indian entrepreneurs it has grown into a global organization with over 40 chapters 
                                                 
23  Thus outmigration of workers from certain villages in Kerala (India) and Bangladesh illustrates the 
pressure on local labour markets. In the case of South Africa the emigration of nurses is a good 
example of the negative impact it might have on the provisioning of health services to AIDS patients.   20
and 6,000 members worldwide. Similarly the Chinese Institute of Engineers in the US 
collaborates frequently with its counterpart in Taiwan. Epistemic communities have 
members who are professionally well connected to the high technology industry. For 
example, within East Asia the MNC-driven mobility of highly skilled workers results in 
technology transfer and human capital development (Chalamwong 2004: 9). Thus the 
movement of talent can also act as a conduit for the diffusion of market knowledge. 
Return migrants contribute to national productivity due to their work experience abroad 
(Lowell and Findlay 2001: 8). Epistemic communities can be productively deployed 
should economic opportunities in sending countries emerge. The chances of expatriate 
talent returning temporarily or permanently increase as the demand for high-skilled 
workers increase at home. Thus the circulation of talent among and within Silicon 
Valley in California, Sao Paulo in Brazil, Hsinchu in Taiwan, Singapore, Bangalore in 
India, Eindhoven in the Netherlands, Frankfurt in Germany, and Shanghai in China for 
example could be a harbinger of brain gain for developing countries such as Brazil, 
China, and India. The developmental implication of this circulation of talent is 
significant especially if expatriates bring back new knowledge, domain expertise for the 
IT industry, market information, and investment capital. The retention of professional 
contacts with their clients and peers can also contribute to business development at 
home. With growth at home the demand for highly trained and experienced talent would 
increase and so would the chances of expatriates returning to sending countries.24 
Taiwan and China, and to a limited degree India, have been witnessing the return of 
high skilled migrants (Saxenian 2003; Khadria 2004). India’s rate of return migrants has 
been only one thirtieth of Taiwan’s (OECD 2003). Most South Koreans who obtained a 
doctorate in science engineering in the US returned home (89 per cent), whereas the 
corresponding figures for China and India were 12 per cent and 21 per cent respectively 
(National Science Foundation 1998 cited in Solimano 2002: 34). Between 1978 and 
2001 roughly 37 to 50 per cent of Chinese students returned from Japan, Australia, and 
various West European countries and only 14 per cent from the US (Zhang 2003: 80). 
More recent figures for the Indian IT industry indicate that about 30-40 per cent of 
experienced Indian software professionals returned (Commander et al. 2004). Among 
returnees there are entrepreneurs and venture capitalists as well. The technology boom 
of the 1990s created many opportunities for immigrant entrepreneurs in the US for new 
start-ups, which were later sold to larger companies. Some professionals quit major 
multinational employers; some returned home to start new businesses in Taiwan and 
India. For example, of the top 20 Indian software firms ten were launched by non-
resident Indians (NRIs) from the US and many joint ventures were between NRIs and 
Indian partners (Hunger 2002: 10-11). However, they maintained close technical and 
commercial links with receiving countries. 
The fundamental policy question is under what conditions such return of migrants can 
be sustained over the long haul. There are several possibilities, all aimed at tapping the 
expatriate communities (diaspora) living overseas. There are private, industry initiatives 
such as Chile Global, which designs and finances business innovation projects 
(Kuznetsov and Sabel 2006). Governments can also play important roles in attracting 
talent back home. It has been observed that for Latin American countries the rate of 
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return is higher than India and China. This is partly due to greater involvement of 
national governments to support studies and professional training abroad and their 
ability to impose the condition that such recipients return home. Colombia’s 
COLFUTURO programme for overseas graduate studies requires students to return 
home within 90 days after completion of studies (Thorn and Holm-Nielsen 2006). 
Similarly, Mexico’s Presidential Fund for Retention in Mexico is aimed at bringing 
back talent, while Mexico’s Ministry of Science and Technology is targeting its 
overseas talent. In the end, the return of technical talent is predicated on global 
networks, state encouragement, institutional support for professional development in the 
home country, and national economic development. 
8  Policy implications of technical talent migration 
The key issues facing both sending and receiving countries today are the imbalances in 
the supply and demand for technical talent, their political abilities to manage the flows 
of people, and their ability to harness the technical expertise of expatriate communities 
for national economic development. Political constituencies in receiving countries are 
right to be concerned if their labour markets are destabilized by lower wage growth and 
unemployment due to inflows of foreign technical talent. However, jingoist immigration 
policies or blanket protectionism are unlikely to be effective in an integrating world, 
especially in the context of serious demographic problems in many OECD economies. 
The availability of foreign workers in these countries will be critical to sustain high 
technology industries and social support for the elderly. Russia suffers from both 
massive emigration of young talent and an ageing population (Heleniak 2004: 16). Even 
China is witnessing an ageing population, while India foresees shortages of IT workers 
as it meets its own demand and the needs of the global economy (NASSCOM 2003). If 
labour shortages are real and the competition for technical talent intense then it behoves 
receiving countries to boost enrolments in technical education and come up with 
flexible immigration policies. East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea 
suffer from both declining fertility rates and resistance to large-scale immigration. 
These are also countries that rely heavily on IT-related high technology industries. 
There is also the issue of reciprocity. If sending countries are compelled to alter their 
economic policies in favour of liberalization to facilitate greater global economic 
integration, often with massive adjustment costs, it is incumbent upon receiving 
countries to create the economic space for a smoother transition for sending countries. 
Nearly all the evidence of mobility of talent points to receiving countries benefiting 
greatly from immigrant labour (see Figure 1). Hence, on both economic and ethical 
grounds it is in the interest of receiving countries to maintain a liberal immigration 
system.25 
Sending countries also benefit from talent mobility via remittance income, often 
exceeding official aid and FDI. More importantly, expatriate technical communities 
could be a vital link for acquiring technology, market knowledge, and domain expertise. 
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There is of course a danger that the outflows of talent may haemorrhage the local talent 
pool to the point where the dynamic costs of human capital development outweigh the 
dynamic benefits. Smaller countries such as those in Africa are likely to suffer more due 
to a narrow economic base and limited educational opportunities for most. Hence, 
sending countries must also have proactive and forward-looking nuanced policies to 
retain talent at home and tap the expatriate population for their expertise. This is a tall 
order but expanding economic and professional opportunities at home, which are in any 
case integral to national development, would be critical to encourage potential 
emigrants to stay and expatriates to return, even if on a circulatory basis (see Thorn and 
Holm-Nielsen 2006). Since emigration of talent leads to greater investment in education 
and raises the average skill level of the population, it would be prudent to promote local 
industry to deploy such talent. Taiwan provides a good example of how the government 
can play a role in inducing expatriates to return home, either permanently or 
temporarily. The Indian experience illustrates how state-driven technical education and 
first-comer advantage in software exports can act to encourage the mobility of talent 
and induce growth in education. The challenge for India and other developing countries 
is how to induce large-scale return or circulatory migration and investments by 
expatriate talent.26 
The international mobility of talent is inevitable and today states are less effective in 
regulating the flows of people (Bhagwati 2003). The General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) Mode 4, which seeks to facilitate the temporary international 
movement of workers, is an acknowledgement of this inevitability. Yet the OECD has 
been biased toward other modes and is hesitant about implementation, confusing the 
temporary migration of Mode 4 with permanent migration. Emigration that is too easy 
may cause political problems in receiving countries as well as reduce incentives for 
education and lower average skills in sending countries. However, the temporary 
movement of talent implies migrants will return and thus contribute to better stocks of 
human capital (see Dos Santos and Postel Vinay 2004: 20). 
The International Labour Organization has identified six ‘R’s as a way to stem the 
outflows of technical talent. They go beyond ‘recruitment, remittances, and return’ to 
include ‘restriction, reparation, and resourcing’ (Wickramasekara 2002: 9, see also 
Lowell and Findlay 2001: 18-19). For various reasons, restriction and reparation are 
difficult to implement. Recruitment and return of talent are challenging but show 
promise for the IT industry. As the IT industry exhibits high growth, global hubs in 
China, India, Taiwan, Russia, and the Philippines become feasible sites for expatriate 
talent. Effective science and technology policies in sending countries are also likely to 
encourage return migrants. Furthermore, dual citizenship, academic and professional 
exchanges, and promotion of knowledge networks are all likely to impact brain 
circulation more favourably for both sending and receiving countries. The best way to 
retain technical talent is through service exports, policy reform for attracting FDI, 
domestic market growth, export market diversification toward underserved Japan, and 
the continued emphasis on technical training (D’Costa 2003b, 2004, Lowell and Findlay 
2001: 2). 
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The IT industry in India displays high salary growth, narrowing the global gap, 
suggesting greater possibilities for retention and return.27 However, runaway growth in 
salaries is compelling Indian IT companies to seek low-cost sites in China. High 
investments in research and development in South Korea were responsible for bringing 
back many Koreans. Taiwanese science and technology policies have led to circulation 
of Chinese talent between the US and Taiwan and now China. It is evident that retention 
and return of talent is effective when there is a perceived high quality of life, 
professional opportunities at home, and access to international professional networks. 
For sending countries these are significantly determined by more mundane 
macroeconomic factors of economic growth, investment, and infrastructure 
development, and at the sectoral level, FDI, education, and science and technology 
policies. 
The importance of return migrants and thus circulation should not be overemphasized. 
Once abroad expatriate populations need not be tied to home country expectations. 
However, temporary visits must be of long enough duration to make it attractive for 
highly skilled workers from non-OECD countries. Also, a longer-term temporary visit is 
likely to result in a greater professional contribution of technical talent in the receiving 
and sending countries, after their return. Currently the H-1B visa programme for 
temporary movement of talent in the US is flawed since foreign workers cannot freely 
move between employers (Watts 2001).28 It would be important to grant temporary visa 
holders greater latitude in choosing their professional outlets. 
9 Conclusion 
This survey of international mobility of technical talent suggests the need for workable 
economic development policies to meet demands in the information-driven economy, to 
address demographic challenges in receiving countries, and to harness the expertise of 
expatriate talent. Uncontrolled immigration is neither politically feasible nor socially 
acceptable in receiving countries. For sending countries the challenge is to retain talent 
and lure previous emigrants back to further national development. Managed but liberal 
immigration is consistent with globalization. In an era of foreign aid fatigue there is 
greater reason to promote development in labour-abundant countries so that ‘brain 
drain’ is transformed to ‘brain gain,’ making international migration over the long haul 
a temporary process. Technical and entrepreneurial skills from the expatriate 
communities can be mobilized for domestic development and at the same time the 
export of skilled labour be accommodated by receiving countries. 
By examining the process of international migration and some of the economic costs 
and benefits of the movement of technical talent, this study provides a window to the 
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workings of the global economy and how the structural relationship between rich and 
poor countries might be altered. The flexibility of the global economic system creates 
opportunities and imposes costs on national economies. Only those countries that have a 
well-educated workforce, high-quality physical and technological infrastructures, and 
relatively pragmatic policy-making capabilities tend to integrate well. Global 
competition demands flexibility and technological capacity. This means that high-value 
service providers such as doctors, computer scientists, geneticists, managers, 
accountants, engineers, chip designers, etc. will be recruited globally to exploit 
emerging opportunities. Labour shortages in many ageing societies will dictate the 
direction and magnitude of flows of technical talent. Already Indian students and 
professionals are in high demand in the IT industry in the US, the UK, and other 
European countries (Silicon.India 2004). The challenge will be to regain part of the 
growing expatriate technical community. 
Government incentives to lure professionals back and the rapid development of the 
home market can contribute to the return flow of talent. Many other professionals, 
though settled abroad, could ‘circulate’ between sending and receiving countries, not 
just between India and the US but between India, the US, Western Europe, and Japan, 
thereby creating multiple nodes of global epistemic communities and transfer 
knowledge gained overseas to their home economies. A substantial responsibility will 
have to be placed on sending and receiving country governments to create dynamic 
national economies, which are expected to absorb skilled professionals by creating, 
retaining, and gaining back talent. 
A more balanced global economic governance policy recognizes that labour mobility 
cannot be contained but skilled labour can be retained or encouraged to return. This 
‘circulation’ of talent will be critical for future innovative capability. The receiving 
countries will have to revisit their immigration policies to ensure that the gains of 
economic integration also accrue to poor economies that send them skilled labour. 
Future institutional research following from this basic investigation on the mobility of 
technical talent must be directed toward obtaining industry and firm level data from 
countries that are on the threshold of relying on foreign workers. There is a dire need for 
more systematic collection of data. Intergovernmental agreements in data collection 
methods will be critical. Also, significant differences among different professions and 
skills call for more sector-specific investigations. A more systematic analysis of labour 
shortages and the future growth of IT-related industries will be crucial to understand the 
extent of shortages and the ability of sending countries to fulfil that need. 
India, China, and a few other countries are faced with a historic opportunity to generate 
the kind of technical talent that will be demanded by the IT sector as a whole. As the 
mobility of labour increases the pressures to open up OECD economies under GATS 
will also increase. Rather than simply lose the talent permanently or rely on remittances, 
sending countries must rethink their development and education strategies. Receiving 
countries will need to be more receptive to poor countries with immigration reforms as 
they utilize technical talent temporarily and permanently from non-OECD economies. 
In the end a fine balance between high rates of economic growth and structural change, 
social policies for the marginalized groups; and a relatively open world economy for 
both high- and less-skilled workers must be found. Only then can the international 
mobility of technical talent benefit both sending and receiving countries.   25
References 
Alarcón, R. (2001). ‘Immigrant Niches in the U.S. High-Technology Industry’, in W.A. 
Cornelius, T.J. Espenshade, and I. Salehyan, The International Migration of the 
Highly Skilled: Demand, Supply, and Demand Consequences in Sending and 
Receiving Countries. La Holla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 
University of California, San Diego: 235-63. 
Barrere, R., L. Luchilo, and J. Raffo. (2004). Highly Skilled Labour and International 
Mobility in South America. Paris, OECD. 
Bhagwati, J.N. (2003). ‘Borders Beyond Control.’ Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb. 
Blouin, C. (2005). ‘NAFTA and the Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers: The Case of 
Canadian Nurses.’ The Estey Center Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 
6(1): 11-22. 
Boyd, M. and D. Thomas (2001). ‘Match or Mismatch? The Employment of Immigrant 
Engineers in Canada's Labour Force.’ Population Research and Policy Review 20(1-
2): 107-133. 
Brandi, M.C. and L. Cerbara (2004). High Skilled Migrants Inflows and Outflows in 
Italy. International Migration in Europe: New Trends, New Methods of Analysis, 
Rome, Italy (mimeo). 
Brown, P. (2001). ‘Skill Formation in the Twenty-First Century’, in P. Brown, 
A.  Green, and H.  Lauder, High  Skills: Globalization, Competitiveness, and Skill 
Formation. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1-55. 
Castells, M. (1998). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 3. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Chalamwong, Y. (2004). The Migration of Highly Skilled Asian Workers in OECD 
Member Countries and Its Effects on Economic Development in East Asia. Paris: 
OECD. 
Commander, S., M. Kangasniemi, and L.A. Winters (2004). ‘The Brain Drain: Curse or 
Boon? A Survey of the Literature’, in R.E. Baldwin, and L.A. Winters, Challenges to 
Globalization: Analyzing the Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Cornelius, W.A. and T.J. Espenshade (2001). ‘The International Migration of the 
Highly Skilled: ‘High-Tech Braceros’ in the Global Market’, in W.A. Cornelius, 
T.J. Espenshade, and I. Salehyan, The International Migration of the Highly Skilled: 
Demand, Supply, and Demand Consequences in Sending and Receiving Countries. 
La Holla: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San 
Diego: 3-19. 
Cornelius, W.A. and T. Tsuda (2004). ‘Controlling Immigration: The Limits of 
Government Intervention’, in W.A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P.L. Martin, and J.F. 
Hollifield,  Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press (2nd edn): 3-48. 
D’Costa, A.P. (1999). The Global Restructuring of the Steel Industry: Innovations, 
Institutions, and Industrial Change. London, Routledge.   26
D’Costa, A.P. (2002). ‘Technology Leap-frogging: The Software Challenge in India’, in 
P.  Conceição, et al. (eds), Knowledge for Inclusive Development. New York: 
Quorum Books: 183-99. 
D’Costa, A.P. (2003a). ‘Uneven and Combined Development: Understanding India’s 
Software Exports.’ World Development, 13(1): 211-26. 
D’Costa, A.P. (2003b). ‘Export Growth and Path-Dependence: The Locking-in of 
Innovations in the Software Industry’, in A.P. D’Costa and E. Sridharan (eds), India 
in the Global Software Industry: Innovation, Firm Strategies and Development. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
D’Costa, A.P. (2003c). ‘Catching Up and Falling Behind: Inequality, IT, and the Asian 
Diaspora’, in K.C. Ho, et al. (eds) Asia.com: Asia Encounters the Internet. London: 
Routledge. 
D’Costa, A.P. (2004). Globalization, Development, and Mobility of Technical Talent: 
India and Japan in Comparative Perspectives. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 
D’Costa, A.P. (2005). The Long March to Capitalism: Embourgeoisment, 
Internationalization, and Industrial Transformation in India. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Desai, M.A., D. Kapur, and J. McHale (2002). Sharing the Spoils: Taxing International 
Capital Flows. Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. 
Desai, M.A., D. Kapur, and J. McHale (2003). The Fiscal Impact of High Skilled 
Emigration: Flows of Indians to the U.S. Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs. 
Docquier, F. and H. Rapoport (2004). Skilled Migration: The Perspective of Sending 
Countries. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Espenshade, T.J. (2001). ‘High-end Immigrants and the Shortage of Skilled Labour.’ 
Population Research and Policy Review 20(1-2): 135-141. 
Florida, R. (2005). The Flight of the Creative Class: The New Global Competition for 
Talent. New York, Harper Collins Publishers. 
Gayathri, V. (2001). Rethinking High-Skilled International Migration: Research Policy 
Issues for India’s Information Economy, OECD. International Mobility of the Highly 
Skilled. Paris: OECD. 
Giese, K. (2003). ‘New Chinese Migration to Germany: Historical Consistencies and 
New Patterns of Diversification within a Globalized Migration Regime.’ 
International Migration 41(3): 155-85. 
Gokhberg, L. and E. Nekipelova (2001). International Migration of Scientists and 
Engineers in Russia, OECD Proceedings. International Mobility of the Highly 
Skilled. Paris: OECD: 177-87. 
Heleniak, T. (2004). ‘Geographical Dimensions of Russia's Demographic Crisis’. 
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
Hira, R. (2004). ‘U.S. Immigration Regulations and India's Information Technology 
Industry.’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change 71(8): 837-854.   27
Hugo, G. (2003). Migration and Development: A Perspective from Asia: Geneva, 
International Organization for Migration. 
Hunger, U. (2002). The ‘Brain Gain’ Hypothesis: Third World Elites in Industrialized 
Countries and Socioeconomic Development in their Home Country. La Jolla: The 
Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California-San Diego. 
Kapur, D. (2003). Remittances: The New Development Mantra? Cambridge, MA: 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. 
Khadria, B. (2004). Human Resources in Science and Technology in India and the 
International Mobility of Highly Skilled Indians. Paris, OECD STI Working Paper 
2004/7, DSTI/DOC(2004)7. 
Kuznetsov, Y. and C. Sabel (2006). ‘Global Mobility of Talent from a Perspective of 
New Industrial Policy: Open Migration Chains and Diaspora Networks’, WIDER 
Research Paper 2006/144, Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 
Latapi, A.E. (2004). ‘Migration and Development: The Case of Mexico’, Paper 
Prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Brussels, 10-
11 May. 
Lowell, B.L. (2001). ‘Skilled Temporary and Permanent Immigrants in the United 
States.’ Population Research and Policy Review 20(1-2): 33-58. 
Lowell, B.L. and A. Findlay (2001). Migration of Highly Skilled Persons from 
Developing Countries: Impact and Policy Responses: Synthesis Report. Geneva, 
International Labour Office. 
Lucas, R.E.B. (2004). ‘International Migration to the High Income Countries: Some 
Consequences for Economic Development in the Sending Countries. Annual Bank 
Conference on Development Economics’, Brussels, 10-11 May. 
Malaha, I. (2004). International Migration: The Case of the Post-Soviet Russia. 
International Migration in Europe: New Trends, New Methods of Analysis?, Rome, 
Italy (mimeo). 
Martin, P., H.D. von Loeffelholz, and T. Straubhaar (2002). Managing Migration for 
Economic Growth: Germany and the United States in Comparative Perspective. 
Washington, DC: The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns 
Hopkins University. 
Martineau, T., K. Decker, and P. Bundred (2002). Briefing Note on International 
Migration of Health Professionals: Levelling the Playing Field for Developing 
Country Health Systems. Liverpool: Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine. 
Massey, D.S. et al. (1998). World in Motion: Understanding International Migration at 
the End of the Millennium. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Mattoo, A. and A. Carzaniga (2003). ‘Introduction and Overview’, in A. Mattoo and 
A. Carzaniga, Moving People to Deliver Services. Washington, DC, World Bank and 
Oxford University Press: 1-19. 
NASSCOM (2002). Strategic Review 2002. New Delhi, NASSCOM. 
NASSCOM (2003). Strengthening the Human Resource Foundation of the Indian IT 
Enabled Services/IT Industry. New Delhi: NASSCOM (Report by KPMG Advisory   28
Services Private Ltd. In association with NASSCOM under the aegis of the 
Department of IT, Ministry of Information Technology and Communications, 
Government of India). 
NASSCOM (2004). www.nasscom.org, 09/08/2004. 
NASSCOM (2005). www.nasscom.org, 08/22/2005. 
Nayyar, D. (1994). Migration, Remittances and Capital Flows. Delhi, Oxford 
University Press. 
Nekipelova, E. and L. Ledeneva (2004). Contemporary Forms of Highly Skilled 
Migration of Russians: Labour Migration of Scientists and Mobility of Students. 
International Migration in Europe: New Trends, New Methods of Analysis, Rome, 
Italy (mimeo). 
OECD (2003). Trends in International Migration, SOPEMI 2003. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2005). Trends in International Migration, SOPEMI 2004. Paris: OECD. 
Page, P.E. (2003). ‘The Temporary Inflow of Natural Persons for the Swiss Market’, in 
A. Mattoo and A. Carzaniga, Moving People to Deliver Services. Washington, DC, 
World Bank and Oxford University Press: 207-10. 
Paltiel, A. (2001). Mass Migration of Highly Skilled Workers: Israel in the 1990s, 
OECD Proceedings. International Mobility of the Highly Skilled. Paris: OECD: 161-
76. 
Parikh, V. (2003). ‘Mode 4 and the Software Services Sector: An Indian View’, in 
A. Mattoo and A. Carzaniga, Moving People to Deliver Services. Washington, DC, 
World Bank and Oxford University Press: 163-170. 
Raihan, R. (2004). Temporary Movement of Natural Persons: Market Liberalisation in 
Services Trade Work for Poor. Annual Bank Conference on Development 
Economics, Brussels, 10-11 May. 
Ratha, D. (2003). Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External 
Development Finance, World Bank. Global Development Finance: Striving for 
Stability in Development Finance. Washington, DC: 157-175. 
Rodrik, D. (2005). ‘Feasible Globalizations’, in M.M. Weinstein (ed.) Globalization: 
What’s New? New York: Columbia University Press: 96-213. 
Saxenian, A.L. (1999). Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs. San Francisco, 
Public Policy Institute of California. 
Saxenian, A.L. (2003). ‘The Silicon Valley Connection: Transnational Networks and 
Regional Development in Taiwan, China, and India’, in A.P. D’Costa and 
E. Sridharan  (eds),  India in the Global Software Industry: Innovation, Firm 
Strategies and Development. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 164-192. 
Saxenian, A.L. (2006). ‘International Mobility of Engineers and the Rise of 
Entrepreneurship in the Periphery’, WIDER Research Paper 2006/142, Helsinki: 
UNU-WIDER. 
Silicon.India (2004). Brighter Job Market in U.S. for NRIs: Report,’ www.silicon.com. 
2004.   29
Solimano, A. (2001). International Migration and the Global Economic Order: An 
Overview. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Solimano, A. (2002). Globalizing Talent and Human Capital: Implications for 
Developing Countries. Macroeconomia del desarrollo. Santiago: ECLAC, Economic 
Development Division. 
Solimano, A. and M. Pollack (2004). International Mobility of the Highly Skilled: The 
Case Between Europe and Latin America. Santiago: ECLAC. 
Sorensen, N.N. (2004). ‘The Development Dimension of Migrant Remittances.’ 
Migration Policy Research Working Papers Series, 1 (June). 
Straubhaar, T. (2000). International Mobility of the Highly Skilled: Brain Gain, Brain 
Drain or Brain Exchange. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics – 
Discussion Paper. 
Thorn, K. and L.B. Holm-Nielsen (2006). ‘International Mobility of Researchers and 
Scientists: Policy Options for Turning a Drain into a Gain’, WIDER Research Paper 
2006/83, Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 
Tremblay, K. (2002). Student Mobility Between and Towards OECD Countries: A 
Comparative Analysis, International Mobility of the Highly Skilled. Paris: OECD. 
US Department of Homeland Security. (2004). 2003 Yearbook of Immigration 
Statistics, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://uscis.gov/. 
Wahba, J. (2003). Does International Migration Matter? A Study of Egyptian Return 
Migrants, Paper Prepared for the Conference on ‘Arab Migration in a Globalised 
World, February. 
Watts, J.R. (2001). ‘The H1-B Visa: Free Market Solutions for Business and Labour.’ 
Population Research and Policy Review 20(1-2): 143-156. 
Whitwell, C. (2002). 'New Migration' in the 1990s: A Retrospective. Brighton: Sussex 
Centre for Migration Research. 
Wickramasekara, P. (2002). Policy Responses to Skilled Migration: Retention, Return 
and Circulation. Geneva, International Labour Office. 
Winters, L.A. (2003). ‘The Economic Implications of Liberalizing Mode 4 Trade’, in 
A. Mattoo and A. Carzaniga, Moving People to Deliver Services. Washington, DC, 
World Bank and Oxford University Press: 59-91. 
Zhang, G. (2003). ‘Migration of Highly Skilled Chinese to Europe: Trends and 
Perspectives.’ International Migration 41(3): 73-97. 
Zhao, J., D. Drew, and T.S. Murray (2000). ‘Brain Drain and Brain Gain: The Migration 
of Knowledge Workers from and to Canada.’ Education Quarterly Review 6(3): 8-
35. 
   30
Table 1 Inflows of permanent settlers by selected receiving and sending countries, 1992-2003 (thousands) 
AUSTRALIA 1992 1995 2000 2003   ITALY  1992 1998 2000 2002
New Zealand  7.2 10.5 21.9 12.4   Albania    11.2 31.2 39.1
United Kingdom  14.5 10.7 9.2 12.5   Romania    5.9 20.7 50.2
China 3.4 3.7 6.8 6.7   Morocco    7.3 24.7 26.1
South Africa  1.3 2.8 5.7 4.6   China    3.4 15.4 15.4
India 5.6 3.9 4.6 5.8   Poland    3.9 7.1 15.3
Total 107.4 87.4 91.9 93.5   Total    110 271.5 388.1
CANADA 1992 1995 2000 2002   JAPAN  1992 1995 2000 2002
China 10.4 13.3 36.7 33.2   China  52.4 38.8 75.3 88.6
India 12.7 16.3 26.1 28.8   Philippines 57.5 30.3 74.2 87.2
Pakistan .. 4.0 14.2 14.2   Brazil  19.2 11.9 45.5 22.7
Philippines 13.3 15.2 10.1 11.0   South Korea  26.0 27.0 24.0 22.9
South Korea  .. 3.2* 7.6 7.3   USA  29.3 18.8 24.3 21.5
Total 252.8 212.9 227.3 229.1   Total  266.9 209.9 345.8 343.8
FRANCE 1992 1995 2000 2002   UNITED  KINGDOM  1992 1998 2001 2002
Morocco 16.4 6.6 16.9 21.4   USA  43.9 39.4 13.0 ..
Algeria 12.3 8.4 12.4 23.3   Australia  25.0 26.6 34.0 ..
Turkey 9.2 3.6 6.6 8.5   India  9.2 11.6 16.0 ..
Tunisia 4.0 1.9 5.6 7.6   South  Africa  2.3 11.1 13.0 ..
USA .. 2.4 2.6 3.4   New  Zealand  10.6 12.0 12.0 ..
China .. 0.9 1.8 1.7   Pakistan  8.3 7.2 10.0 ..
Total .. 77.0 126.8 144.4   Total  175.0 228.0 373.0 ..
GERMANY 1992 1995 2000 2002   USA  1992 1995 2000 2002
Poland 131.7 87.2 74.1 81.6   Mexico  213.8 89.9 173.9 219.4
Turkey 80.6 73.6 49.1 58.1   India 36.8 34.7 42.0 71.1
Russian Federation  24.6 33.0 32.1 36.5  China  38.9 35.5 45.7 60.3
Italy 30.1 48.0 32.8 25.0   Philippines 61.0 51.0 42.5 51.3
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia  .. 54.1 33.0 36.9  El  Salvador  26.2 11.7 22.6 31.2
Total 1207.6 788.3 648.8 658.3   Cuba  11.8 17.9 20.8 ..
           Total  974 720.5 849.8 1  063.7
Note: * 1996 data. Source: OECD (2003: 312-23; 2005: 297-310). 
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Table 2 Expatriates and percentage share of highly skilled expatriates by selected country of birth 
  Total no. of expatriates  % of highly skilled expatriates 
Algeria 1,301,076  16.4 
Argentina 266,070  37.8 
Bangladesh 275,770  27.9 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 536327  11.5 
China 1,649,711  39.6 
Colombia 682,156  25.1 
Hong Kong  587,400  42.8 
India 1,928,199  51.9 
Iran 632,980  45.6 
Jamaica 796,046 24.0 
Morocco 1,364,754 14.8 
Pakistan 655,162 30.8 
Philippines 1,816,418  48.1 
Russia 580,570  43.0 
Vietnam 1,507,164 23.6 
Source: OECD (2005: 148-9).   32
Table 3 Demographic shifts in a global context 














    1980 2001 2015  1980-2001    2001-15  0-14 15-64  65+  Young  Old  2001  2001 
World      4,429.6 6,130.1 7,093.9  1.5   1.0  29.6  63.4  7.0 0.5 0.1 9  21 
Low income  1,613.4  2,505.9  3,090.9  2.1    1.5  36.4  59.2  4.4  0.6  0.1  11  29 
Middle income   1,988.8  2,667.2  3,001.1  1.4    0.8  27.1  66.0  6.9  0.4  0.1  8  17 
  Lower middle 
income  1,626.4  2,163.5  2,413.0  1.4    0.8  26.7  66.4  6.9  0.4  0.1  8  17 
  Upper middle 
income  362.4  503.6  588.1  1.6    1.1  29.0  64.4  6.6  0.4  0.1  7  20 
Low & middle 
income  3,601.6  5,172.3  6,091.9  1.7    1.2  31.6  62.7  5.7  0.5  0.1  9  23 
  East Asia & Pacific  1,359.4  1,822.5  2,041.3  1.4    0.8  26.8  66.8  6.4  0.4  0.1  7  17 
Thailand     46.7  61.2  66.3  1.3    0.6  23.6  70.1  6.3  0.3  0.1  8  15 
Philippines  48.0  78.3  98.2  2.3    1.6  36.9  59.2  3.9  0.6  0.1  6  26 
China     981.2  1,271.8  1,392.6  1.2    0.6  24.8  68.1  7.1  0.4  0.1  7  15 
Japan     116.8  127.0  124.1  0.4    -0.2  14.5  67.9  17.6  0.2  0.3  9  9   33
  Europe & Central 
Asia  425.8  474.6  476.6  0.5    0.0  21.4  67.6  11.0  0.3  0.2  12  12 
  Latin America & 
Caribbean  359.9  523.6  625.7  1.8    1.3  31.3  63.2  5.5  0.5  0.1  6  22 
  Middle East & N. 
Africa  174.0  300.6  387.7  2.6    1.8  36.2  59.8  4.0  0.6  0.1  6  26 
  South Asia  901.3  1,377.8  1,680.0  2.0    1.4  34.6  60.8  4.6  0.6  0.1  9  26 
India     687.3  1,032.4  1,227.9  1.9    1.2  33.1  61.9  5.0  0.5  0.1  9  25 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  381.7  673.9  880.6  2.7    1.9  44.0  53.0  3.0  0.8  0.1  17  39 
High income  827.4  957.0  1,001.9  0.7    0.3  18.4  67.3  14.3  0.3  0.2  9  12 
 Europe EMU  286.7  306.7  306.0  0.3    0.0  16.2  67.3  16.5  0.2  0.2  10  10 
 
a. Estimate does not account for recent refugee flows. DR=death rate, BR=birth rate 
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Table 4 Stocks of non-OECD students in selected OECD economies (thousands) 
  2001 % from non-OECD    2002 % from non-OECD 
USA 475.2 63.4    583.0 64.3 
UK 225.7 41.1   227.3 44.6 
Germany 199.1 48.0    219.0 50.8 
France 147.4 71.9    165.4 74.8 
Australia 121.0 77.6    179.6 76.5 
Japan 63.6 66.6    74.9 69.1 
Source: OECD 2003: 36; 2005: 37. 
Table 5 US inflows of high-skilled workers, including H-1B visa holders 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003
Academic students  251,234  319,467 356,585 648,793 688,970 637,954 617,556
Specialty occupations 
(H1B)  47,322 100,446 117,574 355,605 384,191 370,490 360,498
Professional workers 
NAFTA (TN)  .. .. 23,904 91,279 95,486 73,699  59,446
Intra-company 
transferees (L1)  65,349  63,180 112,124 294,658 328,480 313,699 298,054
Source: US Department of Homeland Security (2004)   35
Table 6 The distribution of H-1B visas among leading Asian countries (% share of total) 
   1990  1995 2003*
China   0.9  2.9 3.5
India   4.1  23.9 21.1
Japan   5.8  3.2 3.7
Philippines 11.2  15.4 1.6
Total issued  65,000  65,000 360,498
Source: US Department of Homeland Security (2004) 
*Fiscal Year 
 
Table 7 Remittances received by developing countries, 2001 (billions of US dollars) 
  All developing  Low income  Lower middle income  Upper middle income 
Total remittance receipts  72.3  19.2  35.9  17.3 
   as % of GDP  1.3  1.9  1.4  0.8 
   as % of Imports  3.9  6.2  5.1  2.7 
   as % of domestic investments  5.7  9.6  5.0  4.9 
   as % of FDI inflows  42.4  213.5  43.7  21.7 
   as % of total private capital inflows  42.9  666.1  44.9  20.2 
   as % of official flows  260.1  120.6  361.7  867.9 
Other current transfers  27.2  6.1  14.0  7.1 
Total remittances and other transfers  99.5  25.3  49.9  24.4 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook 2001, World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, in Ratha (2003: 157). 
 